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The analysis presented in the paper focuses on seigniorage revenues in the period of
transition to market economy and fiscal consequences of European monetary integration.
A comprehensive framework for a measurement of seigniorage revenues in transition
period is presented and estimates of its sources and uses in the period 1990–2000 are
computed and analyzed. The analysis reveals that in Poland at the end of the last decade
revenues from the money creation have not been extensively used as a tool for financing
government expenditures. Furthermore, it is shown that, in contrary to the transition
period, an accession to European Monetary Union will be accompanied by significant
fiscal  gains  resulting  from  redistribution  of  seigniorage  wealth  between  member
countries.
5
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The end of the cold war and the rapid political and economic transformation of the
majority of former socialist countries have created a basis for the gradual formation of
modern democratic societies. In some, most advanced in market reforms, countries
(the  Czech  Republic,  Estonia,  Hungary,  Poland  and  Slovenia),  the  basic  stage  of
economic  transformation  (macroeconomic  stabilization,  restructuring,  change  in
ownership structure, etc.) was completed by the middle of nineties, and the post-
transformation stage has been accompanied by a significant rate of economic growth.
This  success  in  the  transformation  of  Eastern  European  societies  has  created  an
entirely new situation for the European Union (EU), where we currently observe two,
to  some  extend  contradictory,  tendencies:  to  deep  the  community  of  European
countries and to expand the EU. The enlargement of the EU is represented by the
conclusions of the EU summit in Copenhagen (1993), which confirmed the policy of
gradual enlargement of the EU by the associate countries (if they apply for it). Finland,
Sweden  and  Austria  joined  EU  already  in  1995,  however,  the  target  solution  is
considered to be the admittance of the number of Central and Eastern European
(CEE) countries. At the end of 1997 five transition countries – the Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia – were invited to start negotiations on their
accession to the EU. In 1999 five other countries – Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania
and Slovakia joined the first group1.
Although expected integration with the EU should not automatically imply monetary
integration, admission to European Monetary Union (EMU) seems to be a target of all
new members. As mentioned by Feist (2001), it is clear from the Copenhagen criteria2
that adherence to the aim of EMU is one of the duties involved in the membership
process. Thus, we can expect that in few years Poland will enter not only European
Community (EC) but also European financial structures including EMU, and European
6
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1 Until  the  date  12  countries  started  negotiations  with  EU,  namely:  Bulgaria,  Cyprus,  the  Czech
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia.
Turkey, which since Helsinki European Council in 1999 has been also an official candidate, has still to meet
the conditions to be fulfilled before negotiations will be started.
2 The set of criteria laid down at the Copenhagen European Council in June 1993 requires: (i) the
stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and the respect for and
protection of minorities; (ii) the existence of functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope
with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU; (iii) the ability to take on the obligations of
membership, including adherence to the aims of political unification, as well as economic and monetary
union (European Union, 1999).Central  Bank  (ECB)3.  It  is  clear,  however,  that  monetary  integration  is  supposed  to
generate macroeconomic stability and long term growth, on the one hand side, and some
costs, on the other. Among various elements of the cost (which are not always easy to
quantify) the loss of monetary policy and the flow of seigniorage revenues4 from national
central bank seem to be in special importance.
In this context we have to mention that although fundamental market reforms have
already laid the basis for some macroeconomic stabilization in Poland, the country still
meets the problem of significant fiscal imbalances (see Figure 1). In particular, in the
period 1997–2000 the budget deficit in absolute terms has been increasing from year to
year (the budget deficit expressed as a percentage of GDP has shown similar pattern in
years 1999–2000).
7
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3 Note that criteria set by Maastricht Treaty were formally biding only on the first group of EMU
candidates and will not be automatically applied to the new EMU members (see Kosterna, 1998; European
Central Bank, 2000).
4 The theoretical concept of seigniorage is discussed in detail in Section 2, but its core is based on a
simple idea. A central bank makes profits because it is entitled to provide the private sector with legal
tender. While the assets obtained in exchange for it are interest-bearing, the central bank does not pay
interest on its currency issued. This discrepancy results in a flow of central bank profits which helps the
government to finance its budget year after year.












































Source: Ministry of Finance (for 2001 estimation).Although in the last period deficit of the state budget does not exceed three percent
of GDP it is a subject of hot debates and permanent problems5. There is a common view
that, when other fiscal revenues are insufficient for covering the financial needs of the
government, seigniorage can be considered as a kind of income of the last resort. Thus,
if the nation decides whether or not to join EU (and, consequently, EMU), hence to give
up its monetary authority, it also foregoes the flow of seigniorage revenues. Given this,
brief considerations may lead to the conclusion that the loss of independent monetary
policy (resulting from accession to EMU) accompanied by the loss or a significant decline
of  seigniorage  revenues  could  make  budget  consolidation  more  difficult.  Taking  into
account contemporary fiscal problems, a deep understanding (i) the real scale of current
budget  support  from  the  central  bank  and  (ii)  the  principles  of  sharing  seigniorage
revenues in EMU, is important in the context of economic and monetary integration. 
In  the  present  paper,  following  Neumann  (1996),  we  define  seigniorage  in  the
broadest possible sense as the sum of all revenues resulting from the monopoly power
to issue money. Unlike existing empirical studies we take into account the important fact
that  seigniorage  depends  also  on  legal,  institutional  and  operational  details  that  are
relevant  for  the  creation  of  base  money  in  each  particular  country  (see  Klein  and
Neumann, 1990; and Neumann, 1996). This approach not only allows proper estimation
of  the  seigniorage  revenues  in  subsequent  years,  but  also  shows  how  the  size  of
seigniorage revenues should be computed for the purpose of inter-country comparisons
(see Neuman, 1996; and Cukrowski 2001).
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we discuss issues related to
economic understanding of the term  seigniorage, present corresponding definitions, and
describe the sources of total gross seigniorage. In the third section we consider possible uses
of seigniorage revenues. In the fourth section, we describe the data sources, present and
discuss empirical results concerning seigniorage during transition period in Poland. In the fifth
section  we  present  current  regulations  concerning  seigniorage  distribution  in  EMU  and
estimates of seigniorage gains in the case of EMU enlargement. The last section concludes.
2. Sources of Seigniorage Revenues
The concept of seigniorage can be defined in a few different ways (see e.g., Drazen,
1985), and as with most conceptual issues, there is no clear indication which definition of
8
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5 It is expected that in 2002 the budget deficit will reach the level of more than 5 per cent of GDP . seigniorage is the best. In the classical theoretical literature (see e.g., Drazen, 1985) three
basic definitions of seigniorage are used. The first defines seigniorage as inflation tax (π h,
where π is an inflation rate and h denotes real high-powered money). The second defines
seigniorage as opportunity cost of holding money (ih, where i is a nominal interest rate) –
the private sector's loss of foregone interest revenue from holding non-interest bearing
cash  balances  instead  earning  assets.  The  third  –  and  the  most  general  –  defines
seigniorage as total revenues associated with money creation (µ h+(r-n)a, where µ is the
nominal growth rate of high-powered money, r-n is the difference between the real rate
of interest and population growth rate, a is the real stock of interest earning government
assets, a<h). It has been shown (see Drazen, 1985) that the first two definitions are
special cases of the last one. In the analysis which follows we adopt the concept of gross
seigniorage  proposed  by  Klein  and  Neumann  (1990)  and  Neumann  (1996),  which
encompasses  most  of  other  commonly  used  notions  (see  Neumann,  1996,  and
Hochreiter and Rovelli, 2001). In particular, we define total gross seigniorage as the real
gross resource flow to the government sector associated with base money creation




M is monetary seigniorage defined as a change in base money stock ∆ Mt deflated  by
the general price level pt:
(2)
st




P and  At
F denote  a  private  sector  debt  and  foreign  debt,  it
P and  it
F stand  for
corresponding nominal interest rates; 
IRt and IEt correspond to interest revenues and interest expenditures, respectively;
st
A states for seigniorage revenue from central bank's operations  
, (4)
where REt denotes the total revenue of the central bank.
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=Monetary  seigniorage  st
M measures  the  actual  wealth  transfer  which  the  private
sector has to make in order to receive base money in the amount of ∆ Mt from the central
bank. The second term in expression (1) describes the flow of interest revenue on the
stock of non-government debt that the central bank bought in the past in exchange for
non-interest  bearing  base  money  (the  debt  service  on  the  central  bank's  stock  of
government  debt  is  not  included  here  because  it  is  merely  an  internal  transaction
between  the  government  and  the  central  bank).  The  third  term  in  expression  (1)
describes seigniorage revenue from central bank's operations. 
3. Distribution of Seigniorage Revenues
Most  empirical  literature  presents  a  proxy  for  actual  seigniorage  flow  to  the
government  based  on  two  implicit  assumptions:  (i)  the  government  receives  the
seigniorage revenues regardless of the legal and institutional regulations governing the
relationship between the government and central bank, (ii) the amount of seigniorage
revenue transferred to the government does not depend on the specific ways and means
in which the creation of seigniorage is induced by the central bank. This is a simplification
which does not take into account the cost of money production and the existence of the
central bank in general6.  
A more precise analysis presented by Neumann (1996) shows that total seigniorage
is used for: (i) covering the cost of money production and central bank operations st
C, (ii)
net  investment  in  non-government  debt  by  the  central  bank  st
NI,  (iii)  replacement
investment to make up for the exchange rate induced loss of assets (in terms of domestic
currency) st
RI, (iv) budget finance st
G, and (v) the increase in the central bank capital (or is
transferred to the third parties) st


























6 The cost of the central bank could be significant. E.g., Klein and Neumann (1990) show that in the period
1974–1987, about 16.9% of German monetary seigniorage was used to cover the Bundesbank´s operating
costs.Ct
Coin denotes the cost of coinage, and Ct
CB stands for the central bank's cost of




F denote private sector debt and foreign debt, respectively;
, (8)
Lt denotes a book loss (defined as a positive number), and etis an exchange rate;
, (9)
At




O denotes amount of central bank profit transferred to the third parties or used for
capital accumulation.
Part of the seigniorage transferred to the budget st
G (specified by expression (7)) is called
fiscal seigniorage (see Neumann, 1996). In general, there should be two additional terms in
the numerator of the expression (7): Rt
Coin – revenue from coinage (in the case where the
government has rights to issue coins as in Germany, for example); and Tt
B – taxes on central
bank's property and income (when the central bank has to pay taxes on property and income
as, for instance, in Japan). In the case of Poland the government receives fiscal seigniorage
through: (1) net borrowing from the central bank (∆ At
G)7, and (2) appropriation of the central




G ). Thus, fiscal seigniorage is fully determined by expression (9).
4. Seigniorage Revenues in Transition Period
The empirical analysis of sources and uses of seigniorage revenues presented in this
section is based on data from the central bank balance sheets and its statements of
11















































7 Although direct borrowing from the National Bank of Poland is not allowed, the central bank can buy
government bonds on the secondary market.income and expenditures and profit distribution (the main data sources are the Annual
Reports of National Bank of Poland). The sample period is 1990–2000. 
In  Table  1,  the  sources  and  uses  of  seigniorage  for  the  overall  sample  period
1990–2000 are presented in Polish zlotys (PLN) (all flows are expressed in 1990 prices).
The year by year developments of the total gross seigniorage is presented in Figure
2. Development of its sources is shown in Figure 3. The distribution of the total gross
seigniorage in subsequent years is presented in Figure 4. The total gross seigniorage and
fiscal seigniorage as a fraction of GDP in 1990–2000 are presented in Figure 5.
12
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Figure 3. Sources of total gross seigniorage in the period 1990–2000 as a share of GDP
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Revenues from CB operations  1
3
Table 1. Sources and uses of seigniorage revenues in Poland in 1990–2000 (1990 prices)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
                                                                 billion PLN
Total St 6.66 3.25 3.84 1.51 1.10 4.11 1.00 1.79 1.46 0.90 1.36
Sources                                                                                                                   PLN billion
    Monetary St
M 5.30 1.37 1.51 0.94 0.97 2.27 0.74 1.07 1.37 -0.10 -0.46
    Interest St
I 0.80 0.51 0.45 0.17 0.06 -0.08 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.12 0.18
    Revenues from CB operations St
A 0.17 -0.09 -0.04 0.40 0.63 0.65 0.08 0.13 0.03 0.16 0.39
Uses                                                                                                                          PLN billion
    Fiscal St
G -0.39 2.88 3.64 1.31 1.50 -1.19 -0.16 1.05 0.25 0.02 0.002
    Costs of CB St
C 0.14 0.19 0.12 0.13 0.17 0.29 0.65 0.74 0.86 0.77 0.88




RI 6.50 -1.37 -1.88 0.03 -0.07 3.68 0.32 -0.55 0.34 -0.61 -0.78
    An increase in CB capital St
O 0.02 0.09 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Sources                                                                                                              Per cent of total sources
    Monetary St
M 79.5% 42.3% 39.3% 62.2% 88.4% 55.3% 73.7% 59.6% 93.7% -11.1% -34.1%
    Interest St
I 12.1% 15.6% 11.7% 11.5% 5.2% -2.0% 3.0% 2.0% 4.3% 13.6% 13.6%
    Revenues from CB operations St
A 2.6% -2.9% -1.0% 26.2% 57.0% 15.9% 7.7% 7.5% 2.0% 18.3% 28.9%
Uses                                                                                                             Per cent of total uses
    Fiscal St
G -5.8% 88.7% 94.8% 86.8% 136.6% -28.8% -15.5% 58.2% 17.0% 1.8% 0.1%
    Costs of CB St
C 2.1% 5.7% 3.2% 8.5% 15.2% 6.9% 65.0% 41.4% 59.1% 86.2% 65.0%




RI 97.5% -42.2% -48.9% 1.7% -6.3% 89.4% 32.1% -30.8% 23.5% -68.0% -57.5%
    An increase in CB capital St















































































.Note that in 1994 the National Bank of Poland started the denomination process.
New banknotes were introduced, and, consequently, the costs of printing banknotes and
operating  costs  increased  in  subsequent  years  (Figure  4).  Moreover,  since  1994  the
National  Bank  of  Poland  has  been  involved  in  open  market  operations  which  were
ultimately quite costly. In 1995 the total revenues of the central bank raised significantly
(Figure 2), however, the fiscal seigniorage decreased (Figure 4). Decline of fiscal revenues
from seigniorage in 1995 is associated with the increase in net foreign exchange reserves
(see Figure 4) resulting from an improvement of an inflow of foreign direct and portfolio
investment,  new  credits  and  large  purchases  of  foreign  currencies,  large-size  cross-
border  trade,  higher  level  of  economic  activity,  and  the  policy  of  National  Bank  of
Poland8. In the next two years fiscal seigniorage increased again reaching in 1997 the level
of the budget deficit (Figure 5). In the subsequent years the flow of fiscal revenues from
seigniorage decreased significantly. Note that while decrease in fiscal seigniorage in years
1995–96 resulted, to some extend, from contemporary economic situation, the pattern
observed after 1997 (reduction of fiscal seigniorage) resulted from institutional changes
that  significantly  increased  political,  economic  and  overall  (political+economic)
independence of National Bank of Poland9 (see Figure 6). Evolution of basic elements of
political and economic independence of National Bank of Poland is presented in Table A4
14
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8 The  increase  of  foreign  exchange  reserves  caused  a  pressure  for  appreciation  of  the  PLN.  On  16
February 1995 NBP lowered the rate of devaluation to a monthly 1,2%, and in May 1995 implemented a
floating exchange rate mechanism PLN was allowed to float with fluctuations with +/- 7% band of the central
bank rate.
9 See Maliszewski (2000) for details.15
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and Table A5, respectively10. The Act on the National Bank of Poland from 1997 (i.e., a
current version of Polish central bank act) is characterized in Table A6.
Summing up, our estimations (see Table 1, and Figures 2–4) show that in contrast to
the common belief that in most transitional economies revenues from money creation
10 The Act on the National Bank of Poland was firstly enacted in January 1989, and then modified in 1992.
Its current form reflects revisions enacted in 1997.
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Figure 6. Development of political, economic, and overall (political+economic)





















Source: Maliszewski (2000).play a significant budgetary role (see, e.g., Budina, 1997), in the second part of nineties
(except the year 1997) in Poland seigniorage revenues have not been extensively used as
a tool for financing government expenditures (see Figure 5). Note that although in 1995
the  value  of  monetary  seigniorage  increased,  the  value  of  the  fiscal  seigniorage
deteriorated  (due  to  significant  increase  of  foreign  assets).  Such  a  pattern  is  not
contradictory  because  monetary  seigniorage  corresponds  to  fiscal  seigniorage  only  if
other seigniorage components are close to zero. It follows from the analysis presented
above, that in Poland interest earnings on non-government debt (interest revenues) and
revenues from the central bank's operations are important components of total central
bank revenues, and therefore, the conventional concept of monetary seigniorage does
not always adequately measure the total flow of seigniorage. In particular, the results
show that an estimation of the total central bank earnings by monetary seigniorage usually
understates the total flow of seigniorage revenues. At the same time, the results indicate
that  monetary  seigniorage  should  not  be  used  as  a  proxy  for  the  total  flow  to  the
government sector (see Figure 7) since it reflects fiscal seigniorage only if investment
seigniorage is close to zero, something that is usually not the case in transition economies. 
Furthermore, it is important to stress that the results above imply a weakening of the
link between inflation and seigniorage. In particular, much like Klein and Neumann (1990),
we would like to emphasize that the increase in a monetary base (and a country's inflation
rate)  does  not  automatically  imply  higher  fiscal  seigniorage  revenues.  Nor  does  the
inverse necessarily hold, i.e., a decrease in a monetary base (associated with a decrease
16
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Monetary seignioragein the rate of inflation) does not automatically imply smaller seigniorage revenues for
budget  deficit  financing.  An  increase  in  the  scope  of  budget  deficit  financing  can  be
achieved  by  increasing  the  central  bank's  efficiency  instead  of  by  raising  the  rate  of
inflation.
5. Expected Gains from Seigniorage Revenues in European
Monetary Union
Introduction of Euro in the beginning of 1999 has affected not only monetary policy
of the member states of EMU, but has also some fiscal consequences, related to changes
in the flow of seigniorage revenues. First of all, once national currencies and seigniorage
disappeared at national level, this source of budget revenues is not available anymore.
Second, ECB increasing stock of euro, collects seigniorage revenues that need to be
distributed to the member states of EMU. An important point is that current regulations
imply  some  redistribution  of  the  total  seigniorage  within  EMU.  As  the  result,  it  is
expected that some of the member states of EMU will face non trivial gains but at the
same time some other will realize significant loses.
Although negotiations about the distribution of ECB revenues from seigniorage are
being carried out behind closed door, the general principles of their allocation among the
Euro area member states have been already determined. In particular, under Article 32
of the Protocol No. 18 of the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the
European Central Bank of the Maastricht Treaty the sum of the participating national
central banks' monetary income shall be allocated to them in proportion to their paid up
shares in the capital of ECB11. 
Recall from Section 2, that there are three basic components of total seigniorage
revenues:  monetary  seigniorage,  interest  seigniorage  and  revenues  from  financial
operations of the central bank. Taking into account that the national central banks in the
member states of EMU still exist, but are organized in different ways and perform different
functions, the cost of operating them and eventual revenues from financial operations are
not subject to common use. Monetary seigniorage and interest seigniorage, however, are
socialized to a common pull and then redistributed among the member states of EMU.
Since it is unclear where the assets backing the monetary base will be held (especially after
17
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11 The principles of seigniorage redistribution were studied in detail by Sinn and Feist (1997, 2000) and
Gross (1998).EMU enlargement), it is very difficult to predict future flows of monetary seigniorage.
Moreover, given that all central banks will be able to produce the same quality of money,
it might well be the case that part of the monetary base of one country is replaced by
increases in the monetary base of the other, and that interest bearing assets are transferred
accordingly. Definitely, given the sharing rule agreed on in the Maastricht treaty, it would
have a big effect on the net flows of transfer payments between the central banks, but now
it can hardly be estimated. However, in addition to socialization of future increases in
seigniorage wealth, there exists a real problem of socialization of the initial (historically
accumulated) seigniorage wealth (or, in other words, the problem of socialization of the
future interest income generated by this wealth), which has huge redistribution effects
(see Sinn and Feist 1997, 2000, and Feist 2001). This is because the contribution of a
particular  country  to  the  common  pull  of  interest  revenues  generated  based  on  the
amount of historically accumulated seigniorage wealth does not correspond exactly to this
country's share in the ECB, in accordance to which seigniorage revenues are distributed.
Note that since the present value of the flow of interest profits is equal to the market
value of assets held by the central bank as a counterposition to its currency, the waiving
of the future profit flow due to EMU can be treated from economic point of view as
foregoing the assets backing the currency circulation. Redistribution effect (in terms of
foregoing assets backing the currency circulation) for current member states of EMU has
been discussed in detail by Sinn and Feist (1997, 2000). Gain and loses of the countries-
candidates to EU have been studied by Feist (2001). 
As estimated by Feist (2001) the overall effect of full EMU enlargement (including
new members: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Malta,  Poland,  Romania,  Slovak  Republic,  Slovenia,  and  old  the  EU  but  not  EMU
members: Sweden, Denmark and United Kingdom) would be an increase in seigniorage
wealth from 406.8 billion euros to 429.3 billion euros (5.5 percent growth)12. Poland, as
the largest accessing country will contribute with 8.6 billion euros (2 percent of total
currency share). However, the capital share [resulting from the arithmetic average of
population (8.1 percent) and GDP (2.0 percent) shares], which determines the share in
ECB and the receipts from seigniorage revenues will amount to about 5 percent. The gain
of the country understood as the difference between what it contributes and what it
receives, may be calculated as capital share (5 percent) minus currency share (2 percent)
multiplied by the amount of seigniorage wealth in the common pool (429.3 billion euros).
The  simple  computations  show  impressive  gains  of  Poland  from  redistribution  of
seigniorage wealth amounting to 12.9 billion euros. 
18
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12 The estimations presented refer to the situation for the end of 1998, nevertheless, they give a hint about
the scope of possible gains/loses of seigniorage wealth redistribution within EMU.19
CASE-CEU Working Papers Series No. 41 – From Transition to European Monetary ...
In interpreting these results, it is important to note again that the figure above is not
annual value, but that it describes the once-and-for-all gain from the redistribution of
historic seigniorage wealth which is associated with the participation in EMU. This figure
is,  however,  the  best  suited  to  describe  gains  or  losses  from  the  redistribution  of
seigniorage wealth, for a country facing the decision to join once and for all, or not to join
at all.
Given that starting from 1998 the amount of fiscal seigniorage was rather negligible
and continuously decreasing to the amount close to zero in 2000 (see Table 1), and that
the wealth transfer to Poland resulting from redistribution of ECB seigniorage would be
significant, the overall gain seems to be quite transparent.
6. Conclusions
This study has presented the analysis of total scale and the flows of seigniorage
revenues to the budget during a period of transition to market economy and confronted
them with the expected gains from redistribution of seigniorage wealth in the case of
integration with EMU. 
In the paper we used the new view on the formation of the central banks revenues
and transfers from the central banks to the budget which seems to be especially useful
for transition countries. In particular, in contrary to other empirical studies, we have not
relied on the simple concept of monetary seigniorage which measures the flow of the
additional monetary base the government can issue, but instead we have used (1) a new
concept of total gross seigniorage which measures the total flow to the government
sector and (2) fiscal seigniorage which measures the portion of seigniorage received for
budget financing. 
In contrast to the common belief that in most transition economies revenues from
money creation play a significant budgetary role, we found that starting from 1998 the
flow  of  budget  revenues  from  central  bank  seigniorage  was  rather  negligible  and
decreasing. This finding has been confronted with the estimation of the expected gains
from redistribution of seigniorage wealth in the case of EMU enlargement. Taking into
account  that  expected  transfer  of  seigniorage  wealth  to  Poland  resulting  from  the
redistribution of ECB seigniorage revenues, would be significant, fiscal authorities would
definitely not lose from Polish participation in EMU (if the current rules of redistribution
prevail). We have to mention, however, that one country may benefit from redistribution
of  seigniorage  wealth  only  if  the  other  county  loses.  Therefore,  in  addition  to  big20
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beneficiaries of the redistribution process in enlarged EMU (as Poland or Romania13)
there will be also big losers (the overall loss of Germany is estimated to about 49.2 billion
euros, Spain – 19.6 billion euros, Italy – 10.2 billion euros). Obviously, authorities of these
countries may tend to reconsider the rules underlying current redistribution mechanism.
In any case, however, since the current flow of seigniorage revenues to the budget is not
significant, one should not expect that giving up the monetary authority and the accession
to EMU will lead to significant budgetary loses associated with the flow of seigniorage
revenues from the central bank to the budget.
13 See Feist (2001).Appendix
I. Data Sources and Details of Seigniorage Estimation
The main sources of data used for the calculations of the total gross seigniorage and
its components are: (i) The Balance Sheet of the National Bank of Poland and (ii) The Profit
and Loss Statement of the National Bank of Poland. The simplified forms of The Balance
Sheet of the National Bank of Poland for the period 1990–2000 is presented in Table A1,
and the example of The Profit and Loss Statement of the National Bank of Poland for 1997
is presented in Table A2. A short description follows of how Table A3, containing all the
data used for the computation of the total gross seigniorage and its components, is
constructed.
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Table A1. Aggregated Balance Sheet of National Bank of Poland as of December 31, 1990–2000 (PLN billion)
Assets 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
A.1 Due from abroad 3.82 5.07 7.74 13.49 21.36 41.03 56.01 79.44 103.40 120.35 120.70
A.2 Due from financial institutions 7.61 7.51 4.85 6.34 7.02 7.79 10.85 9.27 7.64 7.08 6.87
A.3 Loans to general government 0.59 2.48 4.30 1.87 1.74 1.79 1.81 2.80 1.74 0.00 0.00
A.4 Due from non financial sector 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07
A.5 Securities 0.00 1.89 7.87 13.89 18.22 10.22 11.34 14.43 16.43 19.11 16.99
A.6 Other assets 1.59 2.70 4.54 2.96 4.43 5.08 4.13 3.75 2.13 3.61 1.81
Total assets 13.62 19.67 29.32 38.57 52.80 65.91 84.21 109.76 131.40 150.23 146.45
Liabilities
L.1 Foreign liabilities 0.00 1.37 1.99 5.68 9.94 4.33 4.21 7.15 7.79 14.49 8.51
L.2 Notes&coins in circulation 4.81 6.83 9.52 12.18 14.78 22.41 27.24 31.08 33.99 43.38 38.56
L.3 Due to financial institutions 3.04 3.30 4.11 4.46 5.83 9.56 9.14 12.53 19.65 9.43 10.21
L.4 Deposit of general government 1.37 1.11 1.28 2.27 2.77 3.44 6.13 4.29 4.01 7.04 9.77
L.5 Zloty deposit of non-financial sector 0.00 0.05 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.60 0.01 0.00 0.00
L.6 Foreign currency deposit of non-financial
t
0.69 0.71 1.10 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
L.7 Other liabilities 3.71 6.30 11.25 13.95 19.47 26.17 37.47 51.12 65.94 49.50 44.01

















































































Table A2.  Profit and Loss Statement of the National Bank of Poland as for  31.12 (million PLN)
Revenue 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
R.1 Interest Revenue 1.39 1.24 1.42 1.03 0.97 1.13 1.31 1.11 1.22 1.29 2.26
R.2 Revenue from Financial Operations 0.00 0.00 0.13 1.41 2.85 4.35 3.39 4.34 4.97 5.70 7.83
R.3 Revenue from fees 0.05 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02
R.4 Other revenues
1 0.27 0.02 0.03 0.17 0.22 0.23 0.85 1.45 1.45 1.60 3.01
R.5 Total revenue 1.71 1.35 1.61 2.64 4.05 5.74 5.54 6.91 7.66 8.60 13.12
                       Expenditure
E.1 Interest Expenditures 0.59 0.43 0.38 0.47 0.74 1.54 1.13 0.87 0.77 0.31 0.65
E.2 Open market operations 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.87 2.49 3.70 5.40 3.33 6.37
E.3 Provisions 0.00 0.09 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
E.4 Other 
2 0.09 0.03 0.22 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.83 0.65 0.25 1.88 0.21
E.5 Administration cost 0.04 0.13 0.03 0.19 0.22 0.24 0.30 0.39 0.46 0.56 0.63
E.6 Cost of printing bank notes and making coins 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.17 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.08 0.20 0.22
E.7 Total costs 0.73 0.69 0.66 0.82 1.26 2.88 4.90 5.76 6.99 6.30 8.10
R.6 Profit for the Accounting Period 0.98 0.66 0.95 1.82 2.82 2.86 0.64 1.15 0.67 2.30 5.01
Profit transfer to the budget 0.83 0.58 0.80 1.59 2.48 2.69 0.60 1.11 0.60 2.21 4.87
1 In the period 1997–2000 "Other revenue" (R4) exceeded 1.0 billion PLN. In 1997 the biggest part of R4 consisted in exchange rate gains (1146.4 million PLN).
Similarly, in 1998 it included mainly exchange rate gains (709.9 million PLN) and actualization of the value of assets (666.8 million PLN). In 1999 it included mainly
resources from unplanned income on the release of part of the currency revaluation reserve (670.2 million PLN), FX gains on revaluation (535.9 million PLN) and release
of valuation allowances against bank assets (294.2 million PLN). In 2000 part R4 included mainly: release of currency revaluation reserve (1.5 billion PLN) which was
recorded on the sale of foreign currency to the Ministry of Finance to service the official foreign debt and FX gains on the revaluation (0.93 billion PLN).
2 In 1999 "Other" (expenditure) (E5) achieved 1.0 billion PLN. It was mainly the result of decrease of book value of treasury  bills with constant interest rate (value
of 1.7 billion PLN) received as the result of the conversion the state debt on 30.09.1999.Tables A1 and A2 were used to obtain data needed for the computation of the total
gross seigniorage and its main components (see Table A3). 
where:
P – general price level index (1990 = base year), reported annually by Polish Central
Statistical Office,
CCB – costs of maintaining operations (in PLN billion),
CCo&Bn – costs of printing banknotes (in PLN billion),
G – revenue from central bank's operations (in PLN billion),
R – total central bank profit (in PLN billion),
(RG – iGAG) – net profit distributed to the government (in PLN billion),
(IR - IE) – net interest revenues reported in (in PLN billion),
AF – foreign debt to NBP (in PLN billion),
AG – government debt to NBP (in PLN billion),
AP – private sector debt to NBP (in PLN billion),
M – monetary base (in PLN billion).
Sources:
CCB (costs of maintaining operations) computed base on the data presented in the
Profit  and  Loss  Statement  of  the  National  Bank  of  Poland  (see  Table  A2,  items
E.2+E.3+E.4+E.5).
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1 23456789 1 0 1 1 1 2
1989 18.53 0.06 0.01 0.09 0.26 0.24 0.19 0.58 0.43 2.68 2.57
1990 100.00 0.13 0.01 0.32 0.98 0.83 0.80 3.13 -0.78 7.61 7.85
1991 160.40 0.29 0.01 0.11 0.66 0.58 0.81 2.99 3.26 7.48 10.12
1992 231.46 0.28 0.01 0.19 0.95 0.80 1.04 4.65 10.88 4.80 13.63
1993 318.49 0.34 0.06 1.61 1.82 1.59 0.56 7.79 13.48 6.35 16.65
1994 412.44 0.52 0.17 3.08 2.82 2.48 0.24 11.41 17.19 5.08 20.61
1995 501.52 1.33 0.10 4.61 2.86 2.69 -0.42 36.69 8.55 2.04 31.97
1996 594.31 3.77 0.11 4.23 0.64 0.60 0.18 51.80 7.03 -1.62 36.39
1997 672.76 4.89 0.11 5.79 1.15 1.11 0.24 72.29 12.95 -8.64 43.60
1998 730.61 6.22 0.08 6.44 0.67 0.60 0.45 95.61 14.16 -20.88 53.65
1999 802.21 6.19 0.20 7.31 2.30 2.21 0.98 105.86 12.07 -17.54 52.80
2000 870.40 7.67 0.22 10.85 5.01 4.87 1.61 112.19 7.22 -26.80 48.77CCo&BN (cost of printing banknotes and making coins) is presented in the Profit and
Loss Statement of the National Bank of Poland (see Table A2, item E.6).
G (revenue  from  central  bank's  operations)  presented  in  the  Profit  and  Loss
Statement of the National Bank of Poland (see Table A2, items R.2+R.3+R.4).
R (net profit of the central bank) is reported in the Profit and Loss Statement of the
National Bank of Poland (see Table A2, item R.6).
(RG - iGAG) (net profit distributed from central bank to the government) reported in
by the National Bank of Poland.
AP (domestic private debt held by the National Bank of Poland) is determined as the
sum of due from financial institutions (Table A1, item A.2) and due from non financial sector
(Table A1, item A.4) minus zloty deposit of non-financial sector (Table A1, item L.5).
AG (government debt held by the National Bank of Poland) is determined as the sum
of loans to general government (Table A1, item A.3) and securities (Table A1, item A.5)
minus deposit of general government (Table A1, item L.4).
AF (foreign debt held by the National Bank of Poland) is determined as due from
abroad (Table  A1,  item  A.1)  minus foreign  liabilities (Table  A1,  item  L.1)  and  foreign
currency deposit of non-financial sector (Table A1, item L.6).
IR-IE (net  interest  revenues  of  the  National  Bank  of  Poland)  determined  as  a
difference between interest revenues (Table A2, item R.1) and interest expenditures (Table
A2, item E.1). 
M (the monetary base) reported by National Bank of Poland.
II. Evolution of Central Bank Law in Poland
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Table A4. Elements of political independence (√√ – yes, — – no)
1989 1992 1997
Governor not appointed by the government √√√
Governor appointed for more than five years √ √
Provisions for government’s dismissal non-political only √ √
None of the board appointed by the government √√√
Board appointed for more than five years  √
No mandatory government representative in the board √√ 
Government approval of monetary policy is not required  √
Statutory responsibility to pursue monetary stability √√√
Presence of legal provision supporting bank in conflicts with
the government

Total index 4 6 7
Source: Maliszewski (2000).26
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Table A5. Elements of economic independence (√√ – yes, — – no)
1989 1992 1997
Direct credit facility is not automatic √√√
Direct credit facility is at the market interest rate  √
Direct credit facility is temporary  √
Direct credit facility is of limited amount √√√
Central bank does not participate in the primary market  √
All direct credit is securitized √√√
Discount rate is set by the central bank √√√
Supervision of commercial banks is not entrusted to the
central bank

Total index 4 4 7
Source: Maliszewski (2000).
Table A6. Selected important details of current regulation on central bank in Poland
Central bank governor
Governor appointed by Parliament (proposal of the President)
Term 8 years
Reappointment Two terms
Provision for dismissal Non-political
Central bank board




Government representative Yes (advisory)
Monetary policy
Relation with the government Co-operation
Relation with the parliament Bank submits monetary policy guidelines and
annual reports
Monetary stability objective Yes
Provisions in case of disagreement with the
government
No
Constraints on central bank credit to
the government
Direct loans Prohibited
Securities on the primary market Prohibited
Securities on secondary market Unconstrained
Source: Maliszewski (2000).References
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